Speaking after Morocco's opening World Cup defeat by Iran on Friday, Herve Renard admitted that he'd have been disappointed with even a draw, but the Frenchman may only have himself to blame for a tactical approach that neglected some of the Atlas Lions' key assets.
Renard went for an attacking lineup for Friday's showdown, knowing, perhaps, that with Spain and Portugal to come in Group B, it was imperative that his side began their campaign with a win.
However, despite sacrificing Nabil Dirar for Amine Harit, introduced to complement Hakim Ziyech and Younes Belhanda, Renard espoused a tactical approach which didn't play to the strengths of his key attacking talents.
His strategy appeared to be twofold; to exploit the space and create uncertainty in wide areas, and to hit the flanks with long diagonal balls from the centre-backs.
Here's how @EnMaroc will line up vs. Iran, up next. Hakimi preferred to Mendyl, Amrabat at RB over Dirar, allowing Harit to be brought into the side (he's clearly impressed Renard) and El Kaabi has done enough to displace Boutaib as the main man up front.pic.twitter.com/rJdS1PnQsn
- Ed Dove (@EddyDove) June 15, 2018
On paper, there was logic behind his decision not to focus on the heart of the park and to create overloads out wide.
Under Carlos Queiroz, Iran held Nigeria 0-0 in their opener at the last World Cup, and were only defeated by Argentina when Lionel Messi netted a 91st-minute winner in a 1-0 triumph back in 2014.
They know how to be compact, to employ a deep block, to close the space and to squeeze out central playmakers.
However, we'll never know whether Iran could have matched these levels against Morocco without Saeid Ezatolahi - the influential defensive midfielder who was suspended for this match - and experienced centre-back Jalal Hosseini, who was dropped before the tournament.
Ultimately, Renard opted for a different strategy.
On the day, it appeared - at times - as though his central defenders were his primary playmakers.
Only Javier Mascherano and Sergio Ramos made more passes in their opening match than Medhi Benatia, who managed 94.
Similarly, only Spain and Argentina's centre-back pairing managed more - collectively - than Benatia and his partner Romain Saiss, with the two wreaking havoc early on with effective long balls to wide areas.
Iran didn't appear to be expecting these ranging long diagonal passes, and the accuracy of Benatia and Saiss, coupled with the early intensity from the North Africans, suggested that Morocco were on course for a strong start to their campaign.
The second element of Renard's strategy was to encourage his full-backs to press forward, almost to obscene levels during the first half.
Nordin Amrabat, arguably Morocco's most impressive player, was the most advanced Atlas Lion on the pitch during the first half - quite a remarkable pointer - and is the joint-fifth most effective dribbler in the tournament so far.
He also created two goalscoring chances for his teammates, before being replaced early after suffering a concussion.
With Ziyech pulling inside and deep to create space, Amrabat surged forward, with Achraf Hakimi attempting to fulfil a similar function - albeit more conservatively - on the opposite flank.
While Ziyech and Belhanda were involved in Morocco's considerable possession - over 67 percent - too many of their touches were in harmless areas, and there was none of the scintillating interplay on the edge of the Iranian box that many had been expecting.
This left Ayoub El Kaabi isolated and largely ineffective, although if Renard was to opt for a strategy that exploited the flanks and involved so many long diagonal balls, then perhaps the greater aerial threat of Khalid Boutaib would have been more effective.
As well as primarily using Belhanda and Ziyech as decoys, rather than creative and offensive influences in their own right, Renard must also deserve some criticism for the way he was unable to lift his side after their initial tempo faded.
He waited until Amrabat's injury in the 76th minute to make a substitution, while Mehdi Carcela and Faycal Fajr twiddled their thumbs on the touchline.
By contrast, credit must go to Iran and Queiroz, who arguably outdid Morocco at their own game.
During Renard's early tenure with the Atlas Lions, he succeeded in making the North Africans gritty and hard to beat, with Karim El Ahmadi - positioned in front of the defence - an expert in game management and acting as the coach's on-field general.
Yet against Iran, it was the Asian side who turned to some of these ploys in order to stymie their more talented opponents.
It was Queiroz's team who slowed the play with cynical fouls, wasted time, and sought to intimidate their opponents with overly physical one-on-ones.
They succeeded in smothering the largely ineffective Mbark Boussoufa, and appeared comfortable - after finding their feet - to let Morocco play to the wide areas.
While Iran's counter-attacking approach didn't bear much fruit, it was largely down to their own failings and a lack of composure rather than Morocco's ability to contain them. Indeed, the Lions would have been 1-0 down in the first half had it not been for an outstanding double save from Munir.
While Renard took risks with his team selection, there was then a major disconnect with the ambition of his tactical approach, which appeared too cautions...particularly knowing that a win was almost imperative.
The Frenchman instead opted to take minimal risks in the heart of the park, deny his central playmakers the chance to express themselves, and failed to lift the tempo when it became clear that Iran had sussed out Morocco's approach.
If Morocco are to go out of this tournament at the first hurdle - and if they were to lose against Iran - surely they should do it on their own terms, expressing themselves and playing to their strengths.
Instead, Renard's lack of variation in his attacking approach, and his - almost - shackling of Ziyech and Belhanda left Morocco lacking the kind of creative dimension that ought to have given them the edge against Iran.
Now, their elimination appears almost inevitable, and certainly, their best chance of a first World Cup victory since 1998 has passed them by.